

## First Quarter 2011 Mutual Fund Commentary RS Large Cap Alpha Fund

### Performance and Market Commentary

For the first quarter of 2011, RS Large Cap Alpha Fund (Class A Shares) generated a return of 3.55% versus 6.46% for the benchmark Russell 1000<sup>®</sup> Value Index<sup>1</sup>. Financial Services, Technology and Energy were the sectors that most negatively impacted the Fund's relative performance during the quarter. Within Financials, Citigroup (4.17% position as of 3/31/11) and AFLAC (3.71%), given its exposure to Japan, led underperformance during the quarter. In addition, the Fund's investments in Activision Blizzard (3.33%) and Microsoft (2.81%) drove underperformance in the Technology sector. Finally, the Fund's energy investments also underperformed the index, despite posting a return of over 12% during the quarter. Relative results were negatively impacted by the Fund's under-exposure to the large integrated oil companies, refining and oil service. The Fund's energy investments reflect our desire to limit the capital exposed to downstream and service-related energy businesses. This structural under-weight is driven by our belief that these industries typically do not possess the characteristics required to generate value for shareholders across a commodity price cycle, namely the combination of possessing advantaged assets and having material, capital efficient reinvestment opportunities. However, over short periods of time, particularly when oil prices and refining margins rise, the share prices of these companies may perform quite well. This was true in the first quarter. Instead, we prefer to own only the few cost-advantaged producers of energy and non-energy commodities that we expect will generate attractive returns, irrespective of commodity prices.

Much like 2010, the first quarter of 2011 was not an environment that particularly favored our value-oriented investment strategy. Our investment process is predicated on grassroots business analysis combined with an emphasis on capital preservation. However, during the first quarter, investors demonstrated a preference for high growth businesses, as evidenced by the fact that those companies within the Russell 1000 Value Index with long-term earnings growth greater than 20% outperformed their slower growing counterparts by nearly 800 basis points.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the highest beta\* quintile within the index outperformed the lowest beta quintile by over 200 basis points during the quarter.<sup>3</sup> Typically, these types of beta rallies do not favor a strategy like ours, given our focus on maintaining capital and mitigating risk.

Performance quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. The Fund's total gross annual operating expense ratio as of the most current prospectus for the Class A Shares is 1.04%. Please refer to the most current Fund prospectus for complete details on expenses including fees. The performance quoted, unless otherwise indicated, does not reflect the current maximum sales charge of 4.75% that became effective on October 9, 2006. If the maximum sales charge were included, the performance stated above would be lower. Please read the prospectus carefully for more information on sales charges as they do not apply in all cases and if applied are reduced for larger purchases. Performance results assume the reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. Current and month-end performance information, which may be lower or higher than that cited and is available by contacting RS Investments at 800-766-3863 or visiting [www.RSinvestments.com](http://www.RSinvestments.com).

We continue to focus on companies that are going through positive structural changes that we believe will lead to improving Return on Invested Capital (“ROIC”). In addition, our fixation on maintaining capital and asymmetric risk-reward profiles is an integral component of the RS Value investment process. Long-time readers know that we seek to position our shareholders’ capital to lose less in down markets, and strive to merely keep up with the index during periods of dramatic market price appreciation. While we are disappointed with the Fund’s relative performance, it is not surprising in our view that the Fund underperformed during a quarter where the higher beta names within the index often worked best.

### **Philosophy and Process**

We believe that company-specific value creation is often mispriced in the public markets and, as such, we have built a team of investment professionals who employ a research process that is private equity-like in nature. As business analysts, we are interested in understanding how companies create value over time. We work in teams, dissecting businesses into their component parts to gain insights into how and where capital is being allocated, and the cash flows and returns associated with those capital decisions. As value investors, we believe that capital preservation is the key to long-term wealth creation, and only deploy our shareholders’ capital when we feel that the purchase price available in the market provides us with what we view as a reasonable risk profile. We acknowledge that investment returns are a function of entry price and, as such, we define risk not as volatility, but as the permanent impairment of our clients’ wealth. As portfolio managers, we allocate capital to our highest conviction names, and seek to generate long-term returns as a function of business analysis and proper capital stewardship, as opposed to making macro bets or speculating on individual sectors. We acknowledge that over short periods of time we may underperform a benchmark, but believe that our differentiated team structure, philosophy and process will allow us to generate superior risk-adjusted returns over the long-term.

### **Portfolio Positioning**

#### ***Financials***

Recall that we increased the Fund’s exposure to financial services in late ‘09/early ‘10 as we became more constructive on the sector. During this period, we deployed capital toward those financial services companies that we felt possessed solid capital positions, stable and reliable funding sources, strong management teams, increasing returns on invested capital, and a favorable risk/reward profile over our three year investment horizon. While we have been focused on building our banking exposure, we continue to be discriminating relative to the Fund’s bank investments. Specifically, we continue to target franchises with a culture founded on “relationship lending,” solid core deposit bases, sound capital ratios, and the ability to generate strong cash returns.

Unlike a “transactional lender,” which generally seeks to accumulate assets through the syndicate market, a relationship lender becomes involved in every aspect of a client’s financial life; seeking not only the commercial and personal lending business, but also offering deposit products along with cash and wealth management services. This model allows the bank to 1) build “advantaged liabilities” in the form of core deposits and 2) more appropriately underwrite loans given superior knowledge of the borrower, thereby reducing credit risk. Core deposits, many of which are housed in non-interest bearing accounts, provide our banks with both a low cost source of capital and limited liquidity triggers. In levered business models, liquidity is the linchpin to protecting downside and, as the recent financial crisis has reminded us, liquidity is a scarce asset during periods of crisis. While the lower cost of capital should not be ignored, it is the reduced liquidity risk of a core deposit base that fits into our downside risk assumptions and what we believe builds long-term value for shareholders.

Turning to the current marketplace, while we see signs that credit losses may have peaked, our investment thesis does not rely on improving trends, as our downside analysis continues to assume

a significant degradation in credit. As such, our due diligence process continues to focus on a vigorous analysis of the loan portfolio; understanding underwriting standards (past and present), engaging in discussions with management regarding how they deal with problem credits, and “ring-fencing” or sequestering the most troubled assets. We gain insight by interviewing senior and middle management and by speaking with broader market participants including: distressed and strategic asset buyers, real estate brokers, mortgage brokers, and in-market (both bank and non-bank) competitors. These discussions help us identify the key risks in a particular banking model generally related to credit, regional exposures, capital adequacy, asset/liability management, the competitive landscape, and an increasingly dynamic regulatory environment. These risks inform our credit forecasts, which can be stress tested for sufficiency of capital and to determine the risk of a future liquidity event. Our downside loss scenarios are then pushed further to determine how much additional degradation would need to occur in order to create a capital hole, which could necessitate a potentially dilutive capital event, and drive absolute downside to our entry point.

On a positive note, we continue to believe that the banking industry is undergoing significant structural change, accreting value to traditional relationship focused franchises. We believe that the elimination of irrational competitors and a return to more economic pricing of credit risk will lead to structurally higher long-term risk adjusted returns for these franchises. In addition, we expect that the better positioned banks will garner significant market share from weakened and sub-scale competitors.

In general, valuations within financials remain attractive. Looking forward, we would expect the portfolio to continue to favor banks and life insurance vs. REITs and property & casualty insurance. With returns on new business improving at select banks and life insurance companies, we remain interested in those companies that possess sustainable longer term business models, while seeking to purchase our stake at levels that we believe provide us with more favorable entry points.

### ***Consumer, Business Services, Health Care, and Technology***

While there's evidence of a modest improvement in the unemployment picture domestically, the US consumer remains fragile. Therefore, we remain cautious and selective with regard to our consumer discretionary investments. As always, we seek to invest in companies undergoing company-specific structural change that can lead to an improvement in the Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) profile of the enterprise, irrespective of broader trends in general economic activity.

As detailed in previous commentaries, healthcare has been an area where we have been active in searching for new opportunities. As the impact of healthcare reform becomes clarified, we believe winners and losers will emerge. As such, we continue to allocate capital to those companies that we believe should thrive under different health care reform scenarios. Within business services and technology, we continue to allocate capital to businesses that have understandable and predictable revenue streams with high customer retention rates and recurring cash flow characteristics. As such, we believe that the Fund is appropriately positioned for whatever unfolds within the broader economy.

### ***Hard Assets***

The hard asset pod (or sector grouping) is divided between businesses that we generically label "industrials" and those falling under the natural resource heading. The primary difference between the two groups relates to the laws of mean reversion. In industrials, processing and service oriented businesses, excess returns are typically competed away over time, which is why we focus on *improvements* in returns on invested capital when assessing investment opportunities. In contrast, returns on capital in the natural resource space are a function of where a company's producing assets sit on a supply cost curve. Effectively, returns are driven by the "quality of the rock" and, because geology doesn't change over our 3-5 year investment time horizon, returns on capital in the

natural resource space are not often subject to mean reversion. Due to this fundamental difference, each segment deserves its own separate commentary.

### *Industrials*

While the operating environment for many industrial companies has improved over the past year, we remain concerned about most companies' ability to generate positive pricing in a world where significant excess labor and manufacturing capacity persists. As a result, we have slanted our exposure towards the higher quality, more durable franchises within the industrial landscape. When we can buy these businesses at what we view as reasonable prices given our estimation of downside, and estimate equity returns based on company specific initiatives, we deploy our clients' capital.

### *Natural Resources*

Our objective in managing investments within natural resources is to optimize risk-adjusted returns across a full commodity price cycle. An important part of our process involves visiting various natural resource projects around the world. We do this to gain perspective on how future projects will impact the supply cost curve for a commodity and to identify the owners of what we believe are the most cost-advantaged projects in a given commodity. Importantly, we believe that this work provides us with a basis for assessing current and future incentive prices for various commodities, as well as helping us in our efforts to generate project-by-project net asset value models for the companies we own. We believe that the best way to generate superior through-cycle returns for our investors is by:

1. owning only those low-cost, advantaged producers of commodities ("advantaged" in the sense that the companies own assets that sit at the bottom of a steeply sloped supply cost curve and can earn excess returns on capital, independent of the commodity cycle);
2. investing in advantaged companies that have management teams focused on generating returns that exceed their cost of capital, irrespective of commodity price;
3. limiting sovereign and geological risk; and
4. purchasing stakes in these few advantaged producers only when we believe that their share prices are trading below current net asset value.

We believe that the current environment for natural resources is mixed, which we view as a more normal environment than that experienced in 2008-09 when commodity prices rose and then fell together in a highly correlated manner. So far just this year, oil prices have been strong, due in part to the unrest in the Middle East, while natural gas prices have remained weak. In agriculture, corn prices have strengthened this year while wheat prices have fallen. Within the base metals complex, aluminum prices have risen while copper prices have declined. And, in precious metals, silver prices have been strong while the price of gold fell significantly at the beginning of the year before returning to year-end levels. These divergent short term price movements provide patient long-term investors with opportunities to deploy capital into those producers of commodities that are out of favor, often using capital generated by selling stakes in advantaged producers of commodities where valuations are less attractive. We have continued our due diligence efforts on a number of producers of non exchange-traded commodities (such as salt and potash) in anticipation of future opportunities there.

We believe that in the absence of a coordinated pick-up in global demand, commodity prices will continue to oscillate around their respective incentive prices with a high degree of volatility. We will attempt to use short-term dislocations between price and underlying economic value to establish positions in what we believe to be the most advantaged assets at reasonable prices, and will conversely use periods of strength to reduce exposure to businesses when valuations look stretched. As such, our turnover in the Fund may pick up slightly versus historical levels, although our turnover with respect to companies held in the Fund likely will remain quite low.

The longer-term outlook for natural resources remains positive, in our view. Supply costs for many commodities continue to rise for geological reasons, excess capacity remains relatively low, the

longer-term demand trends from emerging market countries remain favorable, and the risk of inflation in basic commodities continues to rise. Our objective is to continue to expose our shareholders to the most advantaged natural resource companies across the commodities spectrum when valuations are attractive. By doing so, we believe that we are best able to provide our investors with all the benefits associated with an investment in the natural resource space, while also mitigating the associated risks. As long term investors, we believe that these are the markets that establish the foundation for strong future returns, and we are excited about the prospects moving forward.

### **Long-Term, Low Turnover Approach to Investing and Team**

The RS Value Team has long employed a high-conviction investment approach, holding fewer names for longer periods of time. We believe that larger positions in fewer names where we have been able to develop an intimate knowledge of the company such that we are comfortable owning that company over our three year investment time horizon is a strategy that has the potential to lead to favorable long-term returns, and one that is supported by several academic studies.<sup>7</sup>

The RS Value Team's long-term investment time horizon also extends to our people. We pride ourselves on recruiting, developing and retaining some of the best investment professionals in the industry. By and large, we have managed to keep our turnover in investment personnel extremely low. That said, effective the first of this year, Ernst Schleimer is no longer a member of the RS Value Team. After four years with RS, we part ways with Ernst amicably and wish him every success in his future endeavors. Importantly, we are actively looking to hire additional high-quality individuals to our team, and hope to be in a position to announce additional new hires in coming quarters.

### **Outlook**

We believe that we are in a period of protracted volatility as the markets grapple with a variety of issues, including ongoing deleveraging, deflation/inflation risks, government budget deficits, higher taxes, and the potential for rising risk premiums. We have never attempted to maximize short-term results, as we do not believe that our investors would be adequately compensated for the level of risk that we would have to assume. As business analysts, we enjoy fundamentally-driven environments where company-specific structural change and improvements in cash flow returns on invested capital are the primary determinant of investment results. We firmly believe that strength of our team, a consistent and repeatable process and a realistic investment horizon have put us in a position to benefit long-term investors. Moreover, we think that the Fund is very well positioned for an environment where individual company-specific cashflow fundamentals are properly rewarded.

We thank you as always for your ongoing support.

Sincerely,



MacKenzie Davis, CFA




David Kelley



Andy Pilara



Ken Settles, CFA



Joe Wolf

As with all mutual funds, the value of an investment in the Fund could decline, so you could lose money. The Fund invests primarily in equity securities and therefore exposes you to the general risks of investing in stock markets. International investing involves special risks, which include changes in currency rates, foreign taxation and differences in auditing standards and securities regulations, political uncertainty and greater volatility.

Any discussions of specific securities should not be considered a recommendation to buy or sell those securities. Fund holdings will vary.

Except as otherwise specifically stated, all information and portfolio manager commentary, including portfolio security positions, is as of March 31, 2011.

***RS Funds are sold by prospectus only. You should carefully consider the investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses of the RS Funds before making an investment decision. The prospectus contains this and other important information. Please read it carefully before investing or sending money. To obtain a copy, please call 800-766-3863 or visit [www.RSinvestments.com](http://www.RSinvestments.com).***

#### **Appendix – Stock Examples**

Through its Marketplaces and Payments businesses, **eBay Inc.** (4.15%) is a global leader in e-commerce and online payment processing. The Marketplaces business consists of the ebay.com online e-commerce platform as well as other online businesses including StubHub, Shopping.com, and Rent.com. The Payments segment includes PayPal, the dominant online payment solution, as well as Bill Me Later, which offers transactional credit at the point of sale for online transactions. eBay also maintains a 35% interest in Skype, a rapidly growing provider of peer-to-peer voice communications.

Central to our investment thesis is our expectation that eBay will successfully turnaround its core Marketplaces business, which should drive growth in cash flows with minimal incremental invested capital. Historically, eBay was slow to transition its business model, which led to a deterioration in seller and buyer satisfaction and resulted in lost share to Amazon (0.00%) and other on-line competitors. However, we believe that eBay is in the midst of a significant structural change that gives us confidence in the ultimate success of its low-risk turnaround strategy. The combination of new management, a loyal user network, strong cash flow characteristics, a solid balance sheet, and an overall e-commerce tailwind should all support the Company as it refines its platform technology and business model.

Under previous management, eBay developed a reputation for executing value-destroying acquisitions. New President and CEO, John Donahoe, however, has brought a new-found capital discipline to the company, selling non-core businesses and implementing material cost-cutting measures to fund new investment activity. In addition, eBay has made significant investments in technology, having hired Mark Carges from BEA as its new head of Technology. A combination of technical upgrades and better execution have created a more user-friendly experience, owing to a vastly improved search algorithm, better categorizations, etc. Moreover, eBay is driving incremental growth in non-auction formats (e.g., fixed price, classifieds, advertising), while focusing its efforts on niches where it enjoys a distinct advantage over its competitors, such as liquidations and the sale of used or off-price merchandise.

In addition, we view PayPal as an underappreciated asset with significant growth potential. PayPal already has over 80 million active users, enjoys significant barriers to entry and is growing at an annual rate of 15%-20%. We intensely studied the unit-level economics at PayPal and find it to be a very valuable asset. Moreover, we believe that there are numerous long-term growth drivers that

most investors don't fully appreciate. In addition to the network effect that can result from its already large consumer database, PayPal has a tremendous lead in the areas of risk mitigation and fraud prevention, which are critical for getting more customers comfortable with internet purchases. PayPal's international footprint is also very difficult and costly to replicate, yet crucial for cross-border transactions. While the opportunity for the further penetration of PayPal on eBay's platform is significant (target of 75%-90% vs. just 66% today), an attractive opportunity exists for PayPal to further penetrate non-eBay e-commerce merchant accounts, which are only 5% penetrated today.

By opening its platform to over 12,000 third-party developers, the innovation of new applications should help drive additional user growth at PayPal. Moreover, as the PayPal business matures, the potential for margin expansion is enormous. With current EBIT margins of approximately 17%, margins could increase over time. In contrast, Visa (0.00%) and MasterCard's (0.00%) margins stand at roughly 50%. Finally, we believe significant long-term value would be created by spinning-off PayPal as such a move could open up the possibility of earning important new customers such as Amazon.

Generally speaking, the market sentiment on eBay is negative. For example, we believe investors fixated on short-term dilution and/or the credit exposure concerns associated with eBay's acquisition of Bill Me Later, are ignoring the potential upside. This acquisition should spur new customer growth, allowing for cross-selling between Bill Me Later and PayPal customers, and ultimately lowering PayPal's funding costs. Moreover, given that credit is provided on a transactional basis, we believe that the attendant credit exposure concerns were overstated, especially in light of the fact that management has already tightened credit standards.

Given the company's fortress balance sheet (\$5 billion of net cash) and significant free cash flow characteristics (over \$2 billion per year), we believe that our investment in eBay was purchased well within our estimate of downside value. Moreover, we were able to take advantage of the market's low expectations for the stock, and acquired our position at a very attractive first year reinvestment cash flow yield in excess of 11%.

**CVS Caremark** ("CVS") (3.57%) is the 2nd largest drug retailer in the country with over 7,100 locations. As a result of its acquisition of Caremark in 2007, CVS is also one of the largest Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) in the United States. The retail pharmacy business generates profits by selling prescriptions (65%) and consumable goods (35%) at its stores. The PBM segment generates profits through dispensing fees, administrative processing fees, and bulk purchasing spreads on distributed drugs for its clients (corporations, managed care organizations, government workforces, etc.) Currently, CVS generates roughly 70% of its profits from its retail segment and 30% of its profits from its PBM segment.

It has been almost four years since the merger of CVS and Caremark and, while the company's retail operations have performed well during this time frame, the performance of the Caremark PBM segment has been quite disappointing. A combination of weak leadership at the PBM unit, a poorly executed go-to-market strategy with respect to the new combined entity, a few significant contract losses, and the re-pricing of a large government contract have caused PBM cash flows to drop by roughly 15-20% since 2008.

We find the prospect for improved performance at CVS over the next few years to be compelling and believe that the stock presents us with a very attractive risk/reward profile at current levels (low \$30s). In addition, we see ROIC improving due to the following:

1. A new head of the PBM segment has driven stabilization with respect to market share and is working on streamlining initiatives that will take out nearly \$1 billion of costs over the next five years, with \$200 million expected to be achieved in 2012;

2. Incremental profits should ensue as a result of the 'generic wave' beginning in late 2011 through 2014. Within both the retail and PBM segments, the company's profitability should improve because CVS makes more profit dollars per Rx on generic drugs compared with branded drugs. This could add an incremental \$200-300 million to overall profits by 2013.
3. CVS won a new PBM business alliance contract with managed care organization Aetna last year, which will swing from a slight operating loss this year to profitability next year, before ramping to \$200 million in annual profits over the next two years.
4. Lastly, we see an opportunity for CVS to meaningfully reduce its channel inventory by \$2-3 billion over the next few years. In addition to shrinking the invested capital base, this action will significantly enhance cash flows.

In summary, we see CVS improving its ROIC noticeably over the next few years as profitability increases and the invested capital base shrinks. On a sum-of-the-parts basis, we believe that the enterprise is worth \$45-50 per share in the next 2-3 years, while current valuation affords us with what we believe to be ample room above our estimation of the company's downside value.

**Sector Allocation<sup>3</sup>**  
(As of 3/31/11)

Financial Services	25.82%
Technology	13.22%
Energy	12.83%
Materials & Processing	12.20%
Health Care	11.71%
Consumer Discretionary	9.10%
Producer Durables	6.27%
Consumer Staples	3.57%
Utilities	0.00%
Cash	5.26%

**Top Ten Holdings<sup>4</sup>**  
(As of 3/31/11)

Praxair, Inc.	4.18%
Symantec Corp.	4.18%
Citigroup, Inc.	4.17%
eBay, Inc.	4.15%
Talisman Energy, Inc.	3.74%
Aflac, Inc.	3.71%
CVS Caremark Corp.	3.57%
Pfizer, Inc.	3.57%
Occidental Petroleum Corp.	3.48%
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc.	3.42%

## Performance

(Average Annual Total Returns as of 3/31/11)

	First Quarter 2011	1-Year	3-Year	5-Year	10-Year	Since Inception <sup>5</sup>
RS Large Cap Alpha Fund, Class A without sales charge	3.55%	13.05%	4.32%	6.62%	3.90%	11.98%
with maximum sales charge	-1.37%	7.69%	2.64%	5.59%	3.40%	11.84%
Russell 1000 <sup>®</sup> Value Index <sup>1</sup>	6.46%	15.15%	0.60%	1.38%	4.53%	N/A
S&P 500 <sup>®</sup> Index <sup>6</sup>	5.92%	15.65%	2.35%	2.62%	3.29%	10.02%

Performance returns for periods of less than one year are not annualized.

The Fund is the successor to the Guardian Park Avenue Fund, a mutual fund with substantially similar investment objective, strategies, and policies. The performance of the Fund provided in the chart includes that of the predecessor fund prior to October 9, 2006. Performance quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. The Fund's total gross annual operating expense ratio as of the most current prospectus for the Class A Shares is 1.04%. Please refer to the most current Fund prospectus for complete details on expenses including fees. The performance quoted, "with maximum sales charge" reflects the current maximum sales charge of 4.75% that became effective on October 9, 2006. Please read the prospectus carefully for more information on sales charges as they do not apply in all cases and if applied are reduced for larger purchases. Performance results assume the reinvestment of dividends and capital gains. Current and month-end performance information, which may be lower or higher than that cited, is available by contacting RS Investments at 800-766-3863 or visiting [www.RSinvestments.com](http://www.RSinvestments.com).

\* Beta is a statistical measurement of a portfolio's relative sensitivity to the benchmark, which acts as a proxy for market risk.

<sup>1</sup> The Russell 1000<sup>®</sup> Value Index is an unmanaged market-capitalization-weighted index that measures the performance of those companies in the Russell 1000<sup>®</sup> Index (which consists of the 1,000 largest U.S. companies based on total market capitalization) with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth values. Index results assume the reinvestment of dividends paid on the stocks constituting the index. Unlike the Fund, the index does not incur fees or expenses.

<sup>2</sup> Factset, RS Investments.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> The Fund's holdings are allocated to each sector based on their Russell classification. If a holding is not classified by Russell, it is assigned a Russell designation by RS Investments. Cash includes short-term investments and net other assets and liabilities.

<sup>4</sup> Portfolio holdings are subject to change and should not be considered a recommendation to buy or sell individual securities.

<sup>5</sup> Class A shares inception date June 1, 1972.

<sup>6</sup> The S&P 500<sup>®</sup> Index is an unmanaged market capitalization-weighted index of 500 stocks designed to measure performance of the broad domestic economy through changes in the aggregate market value of 500 stocks representing all major industries. Index results assume the reinvestment of dividends paid on the stocks constituting the index. You may not invest in the index, and, unlike the Fund, the index does not incur fees and expenses.

<sup>7</sup> Baks, Busse, Green; "Fund Managers Who Take Big Bets," March 2006., Cremers, Petajisto; "How Active is Your Fund Manager," August 2009., Cohen, Randolph B., Polk, Christopher K. and Silli, Bernhard, Best Ideas March 2010.

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